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1. Motivation 
The reduction of macroeconomic vulnerability in emerging markets is now at the core of 
the research agenda. In this context, liability dollarization appears to play a vital role in the 
understanding of vulnerability and its implications  have been addressed in the literature via 
the inclusion of a “financial accelerator” mechanism1. In particular, its formalization is 
based on Bernanke’s et al. (1999) optimal contract, which predicts a negative relation 
between an external finance premium and firms’ net worth.  
The financial accelerator operates through basically two channels. The first, emphasized in 
Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gertler et al. (2001), implies fluctuations on asset prices that, in 
turn, affect the realized return on capital, net worth and investment decisions. The second 
channel is privileged in Céspedes et al. (2000a and 2000b) and depends on unanticipated 
movements in firms’ debt burden that directly affect their net worth. Not surprisingly, 
liability dollarization plays an important role in the activation of this second channel since 
the unexpected component of a real depreciation can greatly magnify the debt burden of 
firms indebted in dollars. 
Based on this, Céspedes et al. (2000a y 2000b) propose a first approximation to a definition 
of vulnerability. Particularly, an economy is classified as vulnerable if real exchange rate 
depreciations lead to increases in the risk premium faced by firms. This result is neatly 
summarized in a dynamic equation for risk premium and, crucially, depends on firms’ 
leverage. Their framework, however, assumes complete depreciation of capital and thus, 
lacks the abovementioned asset price channel. Gertler et al. (2001) recognize this issue and 
                                                 
1
 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). 
 3
present some simulations using dollar denominated debt and an active asset price 
mechanism. They conclude that under full liability dollarization, an increase on the foreign 
interest rate leads to a fall in investment twice as large as under peso denominated debt. 
Interestingly, under both frameworks, a flexible exchange rate is preferred. In Céspedes et 
al. (2000a) the impact of a depreciation on net exports more than compensates the effect on 
real indebtedness. In Gertler et al. (2001), on the other hand, a fixed regime turns to be 
more damaging because of the effects of the domestic interest rate on the value of capital, 
which are magnified due to the asset price channel. 
Despite these significant contributions to the understanding of the consequences of liability 
dollarization for investment and output fluctuations, some important extensions are in 
order. First, if we want to address the implications of the degree of dollarization, we need a 
general equilibrium model that admits firms’ debt to be denominated in both local and 
foreign currency (the two models just described assume full liability dollarization). Second, 
central bank’s response to exchange rate innovations (given a degree of dollarization) must 
also be assessed in a more continuous manner in order to allow for intermediate exchange 
rate regimes (since “fear of floating” seems a widespread characteristic of emerging 
economies). Given this mapping of policy options regarding the exchange rate and different 
degrees of liability dollarization, vulnerability and welfare can both be assessed considering 
the two channels through which the “financial accelerator” operates. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general equilibrium model with an 
extended financial accelerator mechanism that allows for debt to be denominated in two 
different currencies. Section 3 summarizes the results of a series of simulations for different 
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degrees of dollarization, exchange rate regimes, and weights given to the asset price 
channel. Finally, section 4 concludes and suggests some avenues for further research. 
 
2. An extended financial accelerator framework 
In this section we develop a general equilibrium model for policy and welfare analysis 
under partial liability dollarization. With the exception of the financial block of the model, 
the setup though simpler is very close to that of Gertler et al. (2001). After allowing for 
interior solutions regarding liability dollarization, this framework would permit us to assess 
the role of the asset price channel and the degree of central bank’s concern on exchange 
rate fluctuations. This multidimensional analysis is required if we are to understand 
vulnerability from a general equilibrium perspective and its policy implications with those 
that stem from a welfare point of view. 
 
2.1 The model 
The model refers to a small open economy which has six representative agents: (i) a 
household that demands consumption goods, offers labor and saves in pesos and dollars; 
(ii) a firm that demands capital and labor to produce the final domestic good and exports. 
This agent faces the agency problem that leads to a financial accelerator; (iii) a capital 
producer who sells capital to the firm; (iv) a retailer that buys the firm’s production and 
introduces price rigidities in the domestic good market; (v) a Central Bank that sets the 
domestic interest rate in response to the developments of the economy; and (vi) the rest of 
the world that shocks the economy through changes in the exports demand and the 
international interest rate. 
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2.1.1 The household 
The household owns the profit-generating firm and each period receives the monetary 
profits Πt for retailing the domestic good. It also earns a nominal wage Wt in exchange of 
labor. At time t, the household chooses the consumption Ct and labor supply Lt paths that 
maximize its discounted stream of utility. Additionally, it can save or borrow in assets 
denominated in two different currencies: pesos Bt , acquired in the domestic market and in 
dollars ∗tB , obtained in the international market.  
Consumption and saving 
The household intertemporal problem is: 
∞
−
=
−ν +ξ
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= + Π − + + − + +
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where β is the discount factor, ti and ∗ti  are the domestic and international nominal interest 
rates, respectively and St is the nominal exchange rate. Since Pt denotes the CPI index, the 
budget constraint is expressed in nominal terms. The utility function parameters are such 
that ν ∈ {0,1}  and ξ > 0 . 
The FOCs of the above problem lead us to a familiar Euler equation for consumption:  
 
−ν −ν
+= β 1{ }t t t tC E C R  (1) 
where, provided that pit  is the CPI inflation, the gross real interest rate is defined by the 
Fisher equation:  
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On the other hand, the labor supply choice is determined according to: 
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Finally, the Euler equations for saving in both currencies imply: 
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which is nothing but the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. 
Consumer prices 
Domestic and imported goods compose aggregate consumption. The Law of One Price 
holds for the imported good and since the foreign price is normalized to one, the price of 
the imported good is equal to the exchange rate. On the other hand, the price of the 
domestic good is htP  and is set by the retailer (see below). 
The following CES index defines household’s preferences over the consumption of the 
domestic good htC  and the imported good 
m
tC , 
θ
θ− θ− θ−
θ θ θ θ 	
= γ + − γ
 
 
1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )h mt t tC C C  
where θ > 1  is the degree of substitutability between the two goods and γ ∈ {0,1}  is usually 
interpreted as the degree of openness of the economy.  
The CES aggregator implies the demands: 
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The corresponding consumer price index is given by 
 
−θ −θ θ− 	= γ + − γ 
1
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For simplicity, we assume that the investment good is the same used for consumption. 
Moreover, we impose that the aggregation of domestic and imported investment is the same 
as that of consumption, thus 
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and the CPI (6) is the price of investment as well. The corresponding demands are: 
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2.1.2 Production, financing and retailing  
Wholesale production and capital accumulation 
An entrepreneur produces the domestic good and exports in a competitive market. It 
demands labor from households and buys capital from the capital producer to create output 
Yt according to the production function 
 
α −α
=
1( ) ( )t t tY K L  (8) 
 8
If WtP  denotes the wholesale price index, then labor demand is determined by the cost-
minimizing FOC: 
 − α =(1 ) t tW
t t
Y W
L P
 (9) 
On the other hand, capital stock evolves in accordance with the accumulation rule: 
 +
 
= − δ + Φ 
 
1 (1 )
t
t t t
t
I
K K K
K
, (10) 
where δ is the depreciation rate and the concave function Φ(.) captures adjustment costs of 
aggregate investment It . 
Capital Production 
Given (10), the capital producer supplies the quantity of investment good implied in the Q-
investment condition: 
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1
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1 0tt t
t
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K
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where Qt is the real market value of capital. 
The financial accelerator 
In period t, the firm’s gross project output equals the sum of real output revenues and the 
real market value of the capital stock, net of depreciation, 
 = + − δ(1 )
W
W t
t t t t
t
P
Y Y Q K
P
 (12) 
Equations (9) and (12) allow us to define the marginal gross return to capital (in pesos) as 
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which is simply the ratio of next period’s ex-post gross output minus labor costs to period t 
market value of capital.  
The capital producer will sell to the firm the amount of capital that equalizes (13) to her 
marginal financing costs. To derive such condition, the balance sheet identity of the 
entrepreneur is given by: 
 
∗
+ +
+ = + +
1 1
1
t t
t t t t
t t
D D
Q K N S
P P
 (14) 
Capital acquisitions are financed either with the entrepreneur net worth or by contracting 
debt. The debt could be denominated in pesos (bonds sold to households) or in dollars 
(acquired in the international market).  
For a given dollar debt ratio λt, pesos and dollar debts obey to: 
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Marginal costs equal the debt cost plus a risk premium. Thus, in equilibrium: 
 
∗ +
+ +
+ +
 	   
= + η λ + + − λ +    
 
    
1
1 1
1 1
{ } (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )k t t tt t t t t t t t t
t t t
S S P
E R i i E E
S S P
 
which, using (2) and (4), is simply reduced to 
 + += + η1 1{ } (1 )kt t t tE R R  (16) 
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In (16) ηt is the risk premium that arises because of the existence of agency costs. The 
optimal contract implies (according to Bernanke et al. (1999)) a positive relationship 
between the risk premium and the capital to net worth (leverage) ratio, 
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t t
t
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 (17) 
As in all previous general equilibrium settings that include a financial accelerator 
mechanism, this risk premium plays a central role. In particular, a fall in net worth due to 
either an increase in the realized debt burden or a fall in the realized return on capital will 
imply an increase in financing costs and a fall in next period’s investment following the 
Euler equation (16). It is important to notice that a negative shock on the realized return on 
capital is enough to trigger the financial accelerator mechanism since a fall in investment 
has also a negative effect on the market value of capital and, hence, on next period’s 
realized return (see equation (13)). Thus, the initial shock not only transpires within a 
period but is also magnified dynamically due to the forward-looking nature of both 
investment decisions and the market value of capital setting2.  
As already mentioned, Gertler et al. (2001) recognize the importance of the asset price 
channel and conduct some experiments under full liability dollarization, allowing for the 
market value of capital to affect investment returns. The extension we propose here is 
summarized in equation (15). In particular, we introduce a framework that allows different 
degrees of liability dollarization, as revealed by the presence of the term λt. 
                                                 
2
 See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). This “asset price channel” reveals that a financial accelerator is not only a 
feature of dollarized or partially dollarized economies. In fact, an increase in the firms’ debt burden (due to a 
real depreciation in the presence of liability dollarization) is just another channel by which the financial 
accelerator can be triggered. 
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Because of the UIP condition it might seem that, ex ante, the firm is indifferent between 
any combinations of peso or dollar debt. In fact, the term λt is no longer present in equation 
(16). However, and despite the fact that we can express the Euler condition for investment 
decisions in terms of the domestic real interest rate even under full dollarization (λt = 1)3, 
we claim that the degree of liability dollarization has already been determined and is 
implicit because of the presence of a unique risk premium. This result stems from Castro 
and Morón (2003a) and is described in Appendix A.  
Although the degree of liability dollarization is not present in the Euler equation governing 
investment decisions, its role becomes evident if we explore the evolution of net worth. For 
notational convenience we define the real foreign interest rate expressed in pesos as: 
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In each period, the value of the entrepreneur depends on the ex-post (once all shocks have 
occurred) return to capital and the ex-post cost of borrowing: 
∗
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Using (15), (2) and (18) the last expression simplifies to: 
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3
 In fact, full liability dollarization does not render monetary policy as ineffective under any framework that 
includes a UIP condition and models investment as an ex-ante decision. Thus, financial dollarization should 
be regarded as a phenomenon that “complicates” rather than turns monetary policy ineffective. 
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It is clear from (19) that the higher the value of λt–1 (the degree of liability dollarization), 
the more negative the impact of a real depreciation on the evolution of the value of the 
entrepreneur. 
Now consider that the entrepreneur consumes a (exogenous) proportion (1 − φ) of her value 
and, consequently, the remaining proportion φ is devoted to her net worth, 
 
= φ et tN V    and   = − φ(1 )e et tC V  (20) 
In (20), etC  is the entrepreneur’s consumption.  
Retailing and the domestic Phillips curve 
The retailer buys the firm’s production at the wholesale price WtP , “brands it” and sells it to 
households for consumption and to the firm for investment. In setting the final good price, 
it affords menu costs. We use Rotemberg (1982) approach to model nominal rigidities. It 
consists, first, in finding desired prices, as being in a flexible price environment, and then 
introducing costs of adjustment to move observed prices toward the optimal ones. 
It is well known that the optimal flexible price decision reduces to a standard markup 
pricing over marginal costs. Therefore, the optimal price is = µopt Wt tP P , where µ > 1 is the 
markup. Letting the lower cases being the logs of the upper cases variables, the retailer 
problem is then: 
∞
=
∞
−
−
=
  	β − + − 
   
2 2
1
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1
min ( ) ( )
h
s s t
opts t h h h
t s s s ss tp
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This problem is neatly solved in Vega and Winkelried (2004) and implies the equation 
+ −+ βρ pi = βρ pi + ρpi + ρ∆ +2 1 1(1 ) { } opth h ht t t t tE c p iid
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where < ρ <0 1  is a stable root of the price path such that βρ + − ρ = + β ρ2 1 (1 )c . 
Let ϖ = −Wt t tp p  denote the real (log) marginal cost. Then, for a constant markup 
∆ = ∆ = ∆ϖ + pi = ∆ϖ + γpi + − γ ∆(1 )opt W ht t t t t t tp p s . Upon replacing, we obtain the domestic 
inflation equation: 
 
pi
+ −pi = βκ pi + κpi + − κ −βκ ∆ + κ∆ϖ + ε1 1{ } (1 )h h ht t t t t t tE s c  (21) 
where [ ]−κ = + β + − γ 11 (1 )c  and piεt  is an iid cost-push shock. Equation (21) is a linear-
homogenous Phillips curve where inflation depends on real marginal costs. Nominal 
depreciation ∆ ts  appears in (21) due to the substitutability between the domestic and the 
imported good implied in (6). 
 
2.1.3 Monetary Policy 
The monetary policy instrument is the nominal interest rate and is set by the central bank to 
adjust to deviations of forecasted CPI inflation, domestic output and, possibly, currency 
depreciation, from their respective target or desired levels. The log-linearized version of 
such a rule is given by 
 pi += pi + + ∆ + ε1{ }
i
t t t y t s t ti f E f y f s  (22) 
In the subsequent analysis, the parameter fs will play an important role in controlling for the 
degree of central bank’s concern about exchange rate fluctuations. 
 
2.1.4 Clearing conditions 
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To close the model we need four additional equations. First, the resource constraint: 
 = + + + − +( )h e h m mt t t t t t tY C C I X C I  (23) 
where tX  stands for exports of the home produced good. If tY *  denotes real foreign output, 
exports demand is given by the simple equation: 
 
∗θ
∗
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t
t t
t
S
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P
 (24) 
Two further equilibrium conditions are required. Given exports and imports in the model, 
the balance of domestic and external payments is 
 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
− − −
 	+ − = + − + η + 1 1 1( ) (1 )
m m
t t t t t t t t t tC I X S D B D B R  (25) 
which simple states that the trade balance equals the capital account. Finally, equation (26) 
clears the domestic asset market. 
 − = 0t tB D  (26) 
 
2.1.5 A Welfare index 
For policy analysis, we use a utility-based welfare indicator4. As is discussed in Erceg et al. 
(2000) and Woodford (2003), a good candidate is the unconditional expectation of a second 
order approximation of the period utility function around its flexible-price steady state. The 
index is:  
 = − − ϒZ 1 var( ) var( )t tc l  (27) 
                                                 
4
 The derivations and some discussion are presented in Appendix B. 
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where var(ct) and var(lt) are the asymptotic variances of the deviations of consumption and 
labor, respectively, from their steady state values. The constant ϒ > 0  depends on utility 
and production parameters and on the participation of consumption in the steady state 
overall expenditure. Clearly, this parameter establishes the relative importance for the 
variability of consumption to the variability of labor in welfare. 
As evident from (27), welfare is negatively related to either variance and reaches its 
maximum when = =var( ) var( ) 0t tc l . 
 
2.2 Steady state and calibration 
We calibrate the model to replicate many short-run dynamic features of small open 
economies (the model period corresponds to a quarter). In this sense, the parameters 
governing preferences and technology are standard in the literature5. 
It is important to note however that three parameters are allowed to vary in the simulations 
of the subsequent sections. The first one is the depreciation rate δ. When capital totally 
depreciates in a period (δ = 1) as in Céspedes et al. (2000a and 2000b), the asset price 
channel plays no role. The alternative is to consider an active asset price channel, with an 
annual capital depreciation rate of 5 percent (δ = 0.05/4). As we may see, different values 
of δ will lead to different values of some steady state ratios. In contrast, the other two 
varying parameters, the dollarization ratio λ and the response of the interest rate to nominal 
depreciation in the policy rule fs, do not alter the steady state values. 
                                                 
5
 See, for instance, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Svensson (2000). 
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In the long-run, nominal variables grow at the inflation target, which is assumed to be an 
annual rate of 2 percent, and all real variables are driven by productivity shocks that grow 
at an exogenous rate. Since in our setting foreign inflation is zero, nominal depreciation 
must equal inflation in the long run to ensure a constant steady state real exchange rate.   
We set the annual real interest rate to r = 3 percent, which implies a nominal rate of   i = 5 
percent and, using the Euler equation for consumption (1), a discount factor of β = 0.99.  
Following the UIP condition (4), we set the foreign interest rate steady state value to i* = 3 
percent annually. 
Regarding the utility function, we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ν to 0.9, 
which implies an elasticity of consumption to the real interest rate equal to –1.1. 
Additionally, we fix ξ so that the elasticity of labor demand to the real wage is 2.5. In the 
consumption and investment price aggregators (6) we calibrate an openness ratio of 1 – γ = 
0.3 and we set the elasticity of substitutability (θ) to 11, to have a steady state markup of 
the retailer of µ = 10 percent.  
We consider a capital share of α = 0.35 in (8), and an elasticity of the market value of 
capital to the investment to capital ratio of ϕ  = −(Φ″/Φ′)(I / K) = 0.250 (equation (11)). On 
other side, given β and γ, we fix the adjustment cost parameter of the retailer c so the 
domestic Phillips curve (21) becomes 
pi
+ −pi = pi + pi + ∆ + ∆ϖ + ε1 10.46 { } 0.47 0.07 0.23
h h h
t t t t t t tE s  
which generates suitable dynamics of inflation. 
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In the financial block of the model, in a similar fashion than Céspedes, et al. (2000a) and 
Gertler, et al. (2001),  we set a capital to net worth ratio (QK/N) to 3, which implies a 
leverage ratio of ς = 2. This choice affects some important steady state figures. First, the 
risk premium and the return of capital. Following (17), we set a value of the elasticity of the 
risk premium to leverage (ϑ = (F′/F)(QK/N)) to obtain an equilibrium annual risk premium 
of 350 bps. With this, Rk – 1 = 6.5 percent. Second, it is easy to show that the contribution 
of the capitalist’s consumption to aggregate expenditure is 
−  α − φ  
=    
− φ − δ µ   
1(1 )1
1 (1 )
eC QK
Y N
 
which is a small number that varies between 0.2 and 5.7 percent according to the value of δ. 
The damping parameter φ = 0.98 is set to satisfy the steady state version of the net worth 
evolution equation (19). All this calculations lead to a maximum debt to GDP ratio of about 
12 percent and a maximum capital to gross output ratio 
− δ
τ =
α + − δ
(1 )
(1 )W
PQ K
P Y PQ K
  
of 0.96. 
Regarding the resource constraint, we consider an aggregate consumption to GDP and 
aggregate investment to GDP ratios of 60 and 25 percent, respectively. Given the CPI 
aggregator, we set the exports to GDP ratio to ensure a long-run zero trade balance. This 
composition of expenditure is consistent with a value of  ϒ = 0.95 in the welfare index (27) 
(see Appendix C). 
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Finally6, the calibrated policy rule is 
+= pi + + ∆ + ε11.50 { } 0.50
i
t t t t s t ti E y f s  
  
3. Financial vulnerability and welfare 
As mentioned at the beginning of Section 2, our aim is not just to assess vulnerability as a 
function of the degree of financial dollarization, but to assess this phenomenon considering 
also the role of the asset price channel and central bank’s response to exchange rate 
movements. We believe this multidimensional analysis is required because, given a degree 
of liability dollarization and a shock that calls for a real depreciation, the effects of this 
shock on output and inflation will determine the central bank’s response depending on the 
specific weights given to the arguments in its reaction function. The resulting evolution of 
the domestic interest rate will, in turn, hit investment decisions in a way that may end up 
reinforcing or mitigating the negative effect of a higher debt burden. In this way, the 
resulting path of investment will be the result of this combination of forces that, in addition, 
may or may not be magnified depending on the importance given to the asset price channel. 
 
3.1 The multiple dimensions of our analysis 
Based on our model, we simulated the effects of a negative shock on export demand7 and 
computed impulse responses considering combinations of: (i) a pure (fs = 0) vs. a managed 
                                                 
6
 The remaining parameters of the log-linearized version of the model displayed in Appendix B are: the 
exports price elasticity (θ* = 1.5), the autoregressive coefficients of the exogenous forcing processes (ρi* = ρy* 
= 0.5) and the variance of shocks (0.01 for all shocks). 
7
 To solve the rational expectations equilibrium, we use the algorithm outlined in Klein (2000). 
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float (fs = 1.25); and (ii) the asset price channel “switched” on (δ = 0.05/4) and off (δ = 1), 
for different degrees of liability dollarization. We also estimated level contours for both the 
response of investment and the welfare index under different degrees of liability 
dollarization (λ ∈ [0, 1]) and central bank’s concern with the exchange rate (fs ∈ [0, 2]).  
The analysis we propose will definitely drive us away from a neat analytical presentation as 
the one suggested in Céspedes et al. (2000a). However, an appealing feature of our model 
is that we are able to link vulnerability and the financial condition of firms without relying 
on changes in steady states values, but on the degree of liability dollarization8.  
Since the contributions of our model (and of any other which introduces a financial 
accelerator mechanism) are focused on capitalists’ decisions, the path of investment will be 
the source of novel results. Therefore, in all subsequent experiments we will assess 
vulnerability by measuring the response of investment. In particular, and in order to allow 
for the dynamic effects of our model to become evident (and avoid on-impact responses to 
dominate), investment contours were computed adding the quarterly response of investment 
for the first year. Since this evaluation may seem arbitrary, we complement this analysis 
with welfare assessments. 
 
3.1.1 The asset price channel and the degree of liability dollarization  
                                                 
8
 For example, the debt to GDP steady state ratio proves essential for Céspedes et al. (2000a) results regarding 
their flex-fix discussion. According to Elekdag and Tchakarov (2004), Céspedes et al. model requires a very 
high debt to GDP ratio steady state value (approximately 31%) to justify a peg. Under Elekdag and 
Tchakarov’s welfare metrics, however, this threshold falls to 16%. Beyond this discussion, and insulating 
from the risk of extreme parameterizations, our model can directly assess the role of dollarization for a given 
indebtedness level. 
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Given a degree of central bank’s concern with respect to the exchange rate, the asset price 
channel plays a crucial role in determining the effect of liability dollarization on the 
evolution of investment. 
As revealed if we compare Figures 1 and 2, under a managed float the degree of liability 
dollarization will imply no significant difference in the evolution of investment if the asset 
price channel is not allowed to operate. Crucially, net worth depends on both the realized 
return to capital and realized debt burden and, as expected, return to capital falls on impact 
for any dollarization level (following the fall in output). However, net worth falls less in the 
non-dollarized economy because the debt burden does not increase with depreciation. 
Accordingly, the risk premium experiences a smaller increase in the non-dollarized 
economy. So, why is that investment behaves in the same manner for dollarized and non-
dollarized economies when the asset price channel is switched off? Because the effect of a 
higher risk premium is not magnified via the asset price channel.  
Both the market value of capital and investment decisions are forward-looking variables 
that respond to each other’s expected path. If we switch off the asset price channel, we 
mitigate the impact of the market value of capital on investment. Thus, and without the 
magnifying effect brought by this channel, the effect of a higher debt burden (because of a 
dollarized debt) is not strong enough to cause a significant deviation in the path of 
investment if we compare a dollarized with a non-dollarized economy.  
This result highlights the importance of the asset price channel in understanding 
vulnerability. By looking only at the evolution of the risk premium, one could be tempted 
to classify a highly dollarized economy in Figure 2 as vulnerable. Nonetheless, and faced 
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with the evidence presented in Figure 1, no clear distinction can be made in terms of 
vulnerability without the asset price channel.  
This result, however, heavily depends on the degree of Central Bank’s concern about 
exchange rate fluctuations. The balance sheet channel requires the magnifying effect of the 
asset price channel to render an economy as vulnerable when the Central Bank is mitigating 
the former. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of investment and several other variables under a 
pure float with no asset price channel. In this case, we can establish a clear distinction 
between a vulnerable and a robust economy solely as a function of the level of liability 
dollarization. 
 
3.1.2 Central bank’s response to the exchange rate, investment and welfare  
Since the degree of Central Bank’s concern about the exchange rate is a policy variable, we 
would like to stress its role in the determination of vulnerability and complement these 
results with a policy evaluation based on welfare considerations. 
If we compare Figures 2 and 3 and focus our attention on a highly dollarized economy (λ 
→ 1) , it seems that the central bank retains some ability to improve the performance of 
investment by increasing its degree of concern about the exchange rate, if the asset price 
channel is sufficiently weak. Evidence is less clear, however, if we allow the asset price 
channel to operate (compare Figures 1 and 4). In order to shed more light on this respect, 
Figures 5 and 6 present investment and welfare contours for different degrees of liability 
dollarization and central bank’s response to the exchange rate.  
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The evidence presented is suggestive in various aspects. First, and as already mentioned 
after comparing Figures 2 and 3, an increase in central bank’s concern with the exchange 
rate in an economy characterized by the absence of an asset price channel, can help 
improve investment performance after a negative shock on exports demand. In particular, 
and if we center our attention on Panel A of Figure 5, a fully dollarized economy can still 
exhibit a positive evolution in investment for a sufficiently large degree of central bank’s 
concern with the exchange rate. Moreover, and given the large positive slope that 
characterizes investment level contours when the asset price channel is switched off, the 
investment response can be rapidly increased as we move from a pure float to a tighter 
managed float. This result resembles Gertler, et al. (2001) argument regarding exchange 
rate policy in the absence of an asset price channel: “For countries with capital markets that 
are not sufficiently developed to incorporate market value-based accounting and collateral, 
it might be possible to make a case for fixed rates”.  
Panel B in Figure 5 complements this evidence with a welfare evaluation. Interestingly, 
welfare level contours also exhibit a significantly large slope when the asset price channel 
is switched off. Thus, we can observe a rapid welfare improvement when moving away 
from a pure float. However, since we are concerned with second moments when talking 
about welfare, we can clearly identify a critical degree of central bank’s concern with the 
exchange rate after which any further tightening in exchange rate policy will imply a 
welfare loss.  
It is worth noticing that there is a correspondence between investment and welfare level 
contours. If we focus our attention on a highly dollarized economy, improving investment 
performance (mitigating vulnerability) by means of a tighter exchange rate policy is also 
 23
welfare improving. However, the welfare assessment we propose complements this first 
result by imposing a limit to the degree of central bank’s concern with the exchange rate. 
Interestingly too, this “optimal degree of fear of floating” is not only a feature of highly 
dollarized economies. In fact, a non-dollarized economy can also benefit from a managed 
float in terms of welfare.  
This result crucially depends on the absence of an asset price channel (see Figure 6) and 
can help refine Gertler et al. (2001) argument presented above. In particular, our analysis 
reveals that in those economies were market-based asset values do not play an important 
role in collateralizing lending, vulnerability can be mitigated and welfare improved by 
moving away from a pure float. However, welfare considerations suggest that this does not 
really imply a case for fixed rates nor is this a result valid only for highly dollarized 
economies. In fact, the crucial feature economies with different dollarization levels must 
share for the above to be true is the absence of an asset price channel for the financial 
accelerator. Under this scenario, a managed float would help stabilize output, consumption 
(and labor) without exacerbating investment9. 
If we turn the asset price channel on (see Figure 6), one first obvious implication is that 
both investment performance and welfare deteriorates for a given degree of liability 
dollarization and central bank’s concern with the exchange rate. One less obvious result is 
the sharp decline in both investment and welfare contours’ slope. We can uncover two 
important implications from this result. First, the degree of liability dollarization does make 
a difference. In the same manner as the central bank of a highly dollarized economy 
remains unable to foster a positive response in investment through a tighter exchange rate 
                                                 
9
 Note that weakening the asset price channel implies giving more weight to output, and less weight to the 
market value of capital, in the determination of investment return. 
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policy, it remains unable to prompt a significant welfare improvement by these means. In 
fact, vulnerability is mitigated and welfare is improved as we move away from a pure float, 
but only marginally.  
The second implication comes directly from the one just mentioned. If we seek a significant 
reduction in vulnerability and welfare improvement, reducing the degree of liability 
dollarization seems to be the most adequate route, rather than tightening the exchange rate 
policy. 
 
4. Concluding remarks and avenues for further research 
After allowing for different degrees of liability dollarization in a general equilibrium 
framework that incorporates an asset price channel for the financial accelerator mechanism, 
our model has uncovered some important implications about the role of (i) liability 
dollarization; (ii) the asset price channel; and (iii) central bank’s commitment with the 
exchange rate. 
In particular, the existence of an asset price channel proves important to understand the role 
of the degree of liability dollarization in explaining vulnerability. In fact, evidence suggests 
that in those economies characterized by a managed float and where market-based asset 
values do not play an important role in collateralizing lending (the asset price channel is 
sufficiently weak), a high degree of liability dollarization is not enough to explain 
significant departures in the evolution of investment when compared to non-dollarized 
economies.  
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More importantly in terms of monetary policy options, the asset price channel plays also a 
crucial role to understand the effects of different exchange rate regimes on investment 
performance and welfare. If we assess vulnerability in terms of the evolution of investment, 
we claim that, in absence of an asset price channel, departures from a pure float will not 
only help mitigate vulnerability but will also be welfare improving. This result, however, 
cannot be linked to the degree of liability dollarization. Evidence suggests that a managed 
float may be the optimal even for non-dollarized economies. 
Given this result, can we make a case for “fear of floating” as a welfare improving and 
“vulnerability mitigating” policy option for highly dollarized economies that exhibit a 
strong asset price channel? Evidence reveals that under such scenario, a tighter exchange 
rate policy will only have a marginal effect on welfare and vulnerability when compared to 
that associated to a reduction in liability dollarization. 
If policymakers take the degree of liability dollarization as exogenous, “fear of floating” 
may seem a natural feature of highly dollarized economies after invoking welfare and 
vulnerability considerations. The above result, however, suggests that this is a second best. 
Despite the fact we cannot characterize it a pure policy variable, dedollarization reveals to 
be much more effective in fostering welfare and mitigating vulnerability if we regard an 
economy as characterized by the presence of a strong asset price channel. 
In the dedollarization debate, which our analysis reveals to be particularly important only 
under the presence of an asset price channel for the financial accelerator, one of the main 
issues that still awaits further research in a general equilibrium context is the connection 
between central bank actions and the degree of liability dollarization. Partial equilibrium 
models that stress portfolio considerations (see Ize and Levy Yeyati (1998) and Castro and 
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Morón (2003b)) point out the importance of reducing the relative variance of inflation to 
real depreciation10. They claim that an inflation targeting scheme should account for the 
numerator while less “fear of floating” should help increase the denominator, thus fostering 
financial dedollarization. However, policy recommendations derived from these models 
face the risk of triggering now (via a more volatile exchange rate) the balance sheet effects 
that the dedollarization effort seeks to avoid in the future.  
When assessing this risk, two elements must be accounted for: (i) the effects that moving 
towards a pure float has on investment and welfare under a context of significant liability 
dollarization; (ii) central bank’s ability to reduce dollarization by means of a more volatile 
exchange rate. Regarding this, our analysis has uncovered some important results related to 
the first of the two elements just mentioned. Given the above evidence, we could claim that 
if moving towards a pure float effectively reduces dollarization, this should be the preferred 
policy option in those economies were, in Gertler et al. (2001) terms, capital markets that 
are sufficiently developed to incorporate market value-based accounting and collateral11. 
Crucially, the “if” part in the preceding argument depends on the second element. Thus, 
further research should now be devoted to assess this “ability” in a general equilibrium 
context allowing for different degrees of liability dollarization, different  degrees of 
concern of the central bank regarding the exchange rate, taking as given a financial 
accelerator with a balance sheet and an asset price channel. 
 
                                                 
10
 Others, like Broda and Levy Yeyati (2003), stress the role of currency-blind regulations when explaining 
deposit dollarization.  
11
 If we rely on Broda and Levy Yeyati’s (2003) results, safety nets that discriminate between currencies 
could also be regarded as welfare improving in economies characterized by the existence of a strong asset 
price channel.  
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Appendix A: A unique risk premium under partial dollarization  
A particular feature of this model (shared by others like Gertler et al. (2001) and Céspedes 
et al. (2000a and 2000b)) is that it relies on Bernanke et al. (1999) optimal contract to 
justify the presence of a negative relation between the share of the firm’s capital investment 
that is financed by its own net worth (N) and the external finance premium12.  
Contract terms in Bernanke et al. (1999) stem from the solution to a costly state verification 
(CSV) problem where the lender has to incur in auditing costs in the event of a default. 
Default, in turn, is triggered by the existence of idiosyncratic shocks ( [0, );E( ) 1ω∈ ∞ ω = ) 
which affect the realized return to the investment project ( kRω ). Given firm’s decision 
regarding capital investment ( QK ) and borrowing ( QK N− ), and for a given ex-post 
aggregate return to capital ( kR ), the optimal contract is characterized by a threshold value 
for the idiosyncratic shock ( ω) and a gross non-default rate which depends on this cutoff 
value ( kR QKω ). When the realized shock is above (or equal) to this threshold, the 
entrepreneur pays the lender the non-default rate and retains the difference. For realizations 
below this threshold, on the other hand, the firm declares default, the lender pays the 
auditing cost and earns what is left.  
With this partial equilibrium setting, the optimal contracting problem requires the 
entrepreneur to choose ω  and the capital to net worth ratio ( k QK / N= ) in order to 
maximize its expected share of the total return on capital, subject to the restriction that the 
lender’s expected return (net of auditing costs) equals its opportunity cost, given by the safe 
asset rate ( R ). Bernanke et al. (1999) show that the first order conditions associated to this 
                                                 
12
 The inverse of the ratio introduced in equation (17) in the main text.  
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problem imply a positive relation between ω  and the external finance premium 
k(1 ) R / R+ η = , and between ω  and the capital to net worth ratio (k). Thus, the premium 
on external funds can be expressed as an increasing function of this ratio (or as a decreasing 
function the share of the firm’s capital investment that is financed by its own net worth, as 
mentioned above). 
Castro and Morón (2003a) propose an extension to this contract problem in order to 
account for the existence of debt denominated in two currencies. In particular, they argue 
that the relevant gross return per unit of capital can be expressed as kRτω  ( 0 1< τ ≤ ) when 
there is a mismatch between the denomination of debt and firm’s revenues. Although this 
modification might seem similar to that proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999) when 
considering the existence of aggregate risk, it should be noted that τ  does not represent an 
aggregate shock to the profit rate.  
As recognized in Bernanke et al. (1999), with aggregate risk, ω  will depend on the ex-post 
realization of the return to capital. This implies the existence of a set of state contingent 
solutions to the maximization problem described above (depending on the realization of the 
aggregate shock). In particular, an aggregate shock that affects the return to capital 
negatively will imply a rise in ω  and this, in turn, will mean that both the default 
probability and the non-default rate ( kR QKω ) increase: it will now be easier to observe 
realizations of ω  below ω  and, accordingly, the non-default rate rises to compensate for 
the increased default probability. In order to motivate this kind of state contingent contract 
and to allow aggregate shocks to affect contract terms, the authors introduce debt with a 
shorter maturity than the project, so that debt is rolled over after the realization of the 
aggregate shock. Under this new scenario, the authors solve the maximization problem after 
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taking expectations over the distribution of the aggregate shock, and demonstrate that the 
premium on external funds can still be expressed as an increasing function of k. 
Castro and Morón’s setting is different in the sense that the existence of a mismatch is 
known ex-ante and it implies a larger variability in the realization of the aggregate return to 
capital relative to the no-mismatch situation. So, instead of introducing the possibility of 
debt being rolled over and different contract terms arising after the realization of the 
aggregate shock, different contract terms are introduced, ex-ante, relative to the no-
mismatch situation. Uncertainty regarding the evolution of the exchange rate implies the 
existence of a different contract which calls, in equilibrium, for a larger value of ω  and, 
accordingly, for a larger non-default rate. This is what the term (0 1)τ < τ ≤ is meant to 
capture. In particular, a smaller value for τ  will entail, in equilibrium, a larger value for ω , 
and this can be understood as capturing the existence of more uncertainty regarding the 
evolution of the exchange rate which, in turn, implies more uncertainty regarding the 
realization of the aggregate return to capital under a mismatch. 
Under this setting, the authors show that 
2 (1 ) 0
k
∂ + η
<
∂ ∂τ
, meaning that any deviation of τ  
below unity will lead to a larger sensitivity of the risk premium with respect to the capital 
to net worth ratio. When determining contract terms under a mismatch we can abstract from 
the existence of a continuous support for τ , and just concentrate on the fact that the 
mismatch will imply a deviation of τ  below unity (for any non-trivial uncertainty regarding 
the evolution of the exchange rate). 
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If we rely on the functional form usually proposed for the relation between these two 
variables, the above result justifies the introduction of a larger risk premium if the 
denomination of debt implies a mismatch. Formally:  
1 2
NM M(1 ) k , (1 ) kϑ ϑ+ η = + η =  
where ϑ  is the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the capital to net worth ratio. 
According to the above result, 2 1ϑ > ϑ , which implies a larger risk premium under a 
mismatch ( M(1 )+ η ) relative to the no-mismatch situation ( NM(1 )+ η ).  
Finally, the existence of a unique relevant risk premium for a given proportion of debt 
denominated in dollars, stems from Castro and Morón’s (2003a) partial equilibrium setting. 
They assume a continuum of firms which sell in the local market and seek financing. 
Information about the denomination of their revenues, however, is not publicly available. In 
particular, the denomination of firms’ revenues is not homogenously accessible across 
firms, so they differentiate by the cost that the financial intermediary has to incur in order 
to verify this information. Accordingly, firms are indexed by [ ]ϕ ∈ 0,1i , and this cost is an 
increasing function of the characteristic ϕi . Due to the existence of this cost, the 
intermediary will find it optimal to discriminate (and classify a firm as a “peso earner”) 
only up to a certain threshold ( ϕ*i ). 
Results that stem from the above setting can be easily carried into our general equilibrium 
model. In fact, and for a given proportion of projects selling in the local market, we can 
assume they exhibit some underlying characteristic (from which we can abstract when 
solving the general equilibrium model) which implies that verifying the information 
regarding the denomination of their revenues is more costly than for others. Therefore, and 
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following Castro and Morón, all projects ϕ ∈ ϕ*[0, ]i i  will be discriminated, adequately 
classified as “peso earners”, and charged with a higher risk premium ( M(1 )+ η ) when 
asking for a credit denominated in dollars.  
In their model, Castro and Morón assume that firms which are not discriminated 
( ϕ ∈ ϕ*] ,1]i i ) are, by default, classified as “dollar earners” and, thus, charged with  a higher 
risk premium ( M(1 )+ η ) when asking for a credit denominated in pesos.  Since our intention 
is to justify the existence of a given proportion of dollarized liabilities ( [0,1]λ ∈ ), we really 
do not need to rely on this assumption. Instead, we can assume that, in general, there exists 
a non-trivial proportion of projects ( *i1λ ≤ − ϕ ) which are not discriminated and classified 
as “dollar earners”13. 
Given the above, all projects classified as “peso earners” ( *i1− λ ≥ ϕ ) will have the smallest 
risk premium ( NM(1 )+ η ) attached to debt denominated in pesos. The contrary will happen 
for all projects classified as “dollar earners” ( λ ). Thus, and since all firms will choose, ex-
ante, the debt denomination with the smallest cost, it is possible to justify the existence of 
debt denominated in both currencies and only one relevant risk premium 
( 1NM(1 ) k k (1 )ϑ ϑ+ η = = = + η ).  
 
 
                                                 
13
 Note that our intention is not to endogenize the proportion of dollarized liabilities but to work with any 
given proportion in the support [0,1]. If we were to endogenize λ, we could no longer abstract from the 
underlying characteristic that implies different discrimination costs when solving the general equilibrium 
model. As already mentioned, this is beyond the scope of the present analysis.       
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Appendix B: Derivation of the Welfare Index 
Following Erceg, et al. (2000), the expectation of the quadratic term of the second order 
approximation of the period utility function is 
 Θ = + +2 2var( ) cov( , ) var( )CC t CL t t LL tU C c U c l U L l  (B1) 
where ct and lt are the deviations of consumption and labor, respectively, from its steady 
state values, C and L, and “var” stands for the asymptotic variance operator. In (B1) we 
have suppressed any constant term.  
Note that the simple utility function used in the text implies that = 0CLU , < 0CCU  and 
< 0LLU . With this, expression (B1) is unambiguously negative and measures the welfare 
losses related to fluctuations in consumption and labor. In order to get an index decreasing 
in both asymptotic variances, we shall consider instead  
 
Θ
= −Z 21
CCU C
 (B2) 
so the bigger Z  is, the higher the welfare (the smaller the welfare losses). 
We now move to express (B2) in terms of the model’s parameters and steady state values. 
Note that 
 = − −Z
2
21 var( ) var( )
LL
t t
CC
U L
c l
U C
 (B3) 
It is useful to recall some of the properties of the utility function. In particular,  
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−ν
=
ν
= −
C
CC C
U C
U U
C
   and   
ξ
= −
ξ
=
L
LL L
U L
U U
L
 (B4) 
On the other hand, the labor supply (3) and the firm’s labor demand (9) implies in steady 
state that 
 − =
L
C
U W
U P
  and   − α =(1 ) W
Y W
L P
 (B5) 
Finally, the flexible-price pricing over marginal cost implies in equilibrium that 
 = = µ
h
W W
P P
P P
 (B6) 
Combining (B4), (B5) and (B6) is easy to verify that 
 
− αξ
=
ν µ
2
2
(1 )LL
CC
U L Y
U C C
 (B7) 
So that the welfare index becomes 
 
 − α ξ
= − − = − − ϒ ν µ 
Z (1 )1 var( ) var( ) 1 var( ) var( )t t t t
Y
c l c l
C
 (B8) 
which is equation (27) in the main text. 
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